The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals / Residents problem (HR) that is important in practical applications because it models the case where couples submit joint preference lists over pairs of hospitals (h i , h j ). We consider a natural restriction of HRC in which the members of a couple have individual preference lists over hospitals, and the joint preference list of the couple is consistent with these individual lists in a precise sense. We give an appropriate stability definition and show that, in this context, the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete, even if each resident's preference list is of length at most 3 and each hospital has capacity at most 2. However, with respect to classical (Gale-Shapley) stability, we give a linear-time algorithm to find a stable matching or report that none exists, regardless of the preference list lengths or the hospital capacities. Finally, for an alternative formulation of our restriction of HRC, which we call the Hospitals / Residents problem with Sizes (HRS), we give a linear-time algorithm that always finds a stable matching for the case that hospital preference lists are of length at most 2, and where hospital capacities can be arbitrary.
Introduction
An instance I of the classical Hospitals / Residents problem (HR) [4] involves two sets, namely a set R = {r 1 , . . . , r n } of residents and a set H = {h 1 , . . . , h m } of hospitals. Each resident in R seeks to be assigned to a hospital, whilst each hospital h j ∈ H has a capacity c j ∈ Z + indicating the maximum number of residents who could be assigned to h j . Each resident r i ∈ R ranks a subset of H, his acceptable hospitals, in strict order of preference, and each hospital h j ∈ H ranks, again in strict order, those residents who find h j acceptable. A solution of I is a matching (i.e., an assignment of mutually acceptable (resident, hospital) pairs such that no resident is assigned more than one hospital, and no hospital is assigned more residents than its capacity) that is stable [4, 6] . A matching is stable if it admits no blocking pair. Informally, a blocking pair of M is a resident and hospital who would prefer to be assigned to one another than remain with their allocations in M . It is known that every instance of HR admits a stable matching, and that such a matching can be found in linear time using the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm [4] ; [6, Section 1.6] .
HR is a many-one extension of the classical Stable Marriage problem [4] , so called because of its widespread application to centralised automated matching schemes that allocate graduating medical students (residents) to hospital posts. In particular the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the USA [16] , the Canadian Resident Matching Service [17] and the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) [7, 18] all essentially incorporate extensions of the Gale-Shapley algorithm for HR.
Couples
In the above practical applications, the existence of couples who wish to be located at the same hospital, or at hospitals close to one another, gives rise to an important variant of HR called the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) [14, 13, 9, 10, 11] . The study of this problem was motivated by the fact that, over the years, participation in the NRMP was observed to decrease, possibly as a result of the original algorithm being unable to accommodate the complicated preference structure of couples [6, p.4] ; [15, p.7] .
An instance of HRC involves both single residents and couples (pairs of residents) such that each resident belongs to at most one couple. Each couple (r i , r j ) has a preference list over pairs of hospitals (h k , h l ), representing the assignment of r i to h k and of r j to h l . Ronn [13] (see also [6, Section 1.6.6]) described a stability criterion for a matching in HRC that is a natural generalisation of the analogous concept in the HR context (we define this stability concept formally in Section 2. Roth [14] showed that an HRC instance need not admit a stable matching, whilst Ronn proved that the problem of deciding whether an HRC instance admits a stable matching is NP-complete, even if there are no single residents and each hospital has capacity 1 [13] .
Consistent couples
In this paper we consider a natural restriction of HRC in which each member of a given couple (r i , r j ) has an individual preference list over a subset of hospitals, and the joint preference list of the couple is consistent with the individual preferences of r i and r j in a precise sense. That is, (r i , r j ) ranks distinct pairs of hospitals in order of preference, such that (h p , h q ) precedes (h r , h s ) on this list implies that (i) either r i prefers h p to h r or h p = h r , and (ii) either r j prefers h q to h s , or h q = h s . We refer to this restriction of HRC as the Hospitals / Residents problem with Consistent Couples (HRCC).
Thus HRCC models a situation in which the members of each couple can agree to construct a joint preference list from their individual preferences consistently, in the sense that if a couple jointly prefers (h p , h q ) to (h r , h s ), then when comparing h p to h r , r i would be no worse off, and similarly when comparing h q to h s , r j would be no worse off. This includes the case where both members of a given couple have identical individual preference lists, with the intended outcome being that they are either matched to the same hospital or not matched at all.
HRCC does not seem to have been studied previously in the literature from an algorithmic point of view. In this paper we show that an instance I of HRCC need not admit a stable matching, and that the problem of deciding whether I admits a stable matching is NP-complete. This result holds even if the length of each resident's individual list and the length of each couple's joint list is at most 3, and the capacity of each hospital is at most 2, thus providing another highly restricted version of HRC that remains NP-complete, in addition to the case considered by Ronn [13] . This restriction is important from a practical viewpoint, because in many applications the preference lists on one side tend to be short (for example in the context of SFAS, residents are asked to rank up to 6 hospitals in order of preference).
By contrast, we also give a linear-time algorithm to find a stable matching or report that none exists, for the case that stability is defined with respect to classical (GaleShapley) stability (that is, each member of a couple can form a blocking pair with a hospital without regard to the other member of the couple). This version of stability can be motivated in the HRCC context as follows. Suppose that a given couple (r i , r j ) is given the joint assignment (h r , h s ) by a matching algorithm. Now suppose that r i prefers some hospital h p to h r , whilst the joint assignment (h p , h s ) is not acceptable to the couple for whatever reason. The previously stated acceptance of the couple to supply a joint (consistent) preference list could be overridden in practice if r i has an overarching desire to be allocated to h p as opposed to h r (where h p may be far away from h r ). In reality this could mean that either r j moves with r i to remain geographically close, and attempts to make an arrangement with h p (or a hospital nearby) outside of the matching scheme, or r j changes career, or indeed the couple even split up. In the spirit of "keeping partners together", as indicated by the title of this paper, this is a situation that we seek to avoid, thus motivating this stronger form of stability in the context of HRCC. Hence we obtain a natural restriction of HRC that, unlike the general problem, is solvable in polynomial time. Our algorithm does not make any assumptions on the lengths of the preference lists or on the hospital capacities.
Hospitals / Residents problem with Sizes
As alluded to above, a special case of HRCC arises when each couple (r i , r j ) satisfies the property that the individual preference lists of r i and r j are identical, and the joint preference list of (r i , r j ) satisfies the property that h p = h q for any element (h p , h q ) on this list. Thus r i and r j wish to be either assigned to the same hospital, or both be unassigned. We refer to this restriction of HRIC as the Hospitals / Residents problem with Inseparable Couples (HRIC).
Let I be an instance of HRIC and let (r i , r j ) be a couple in I. Given the structure of (r i , r j )'s preference list, it is natural to replace (r i , r j ) by a single entity C i,j whose preference list is obtained from that of (r i , r j ) by replacing each occurrence of (h k , h k ) by h k . Thus each single resident occupies one place at a given hospital, whilst each couple occupies two places. This suggests a natural generalisation of HRIC to the case where each resident r i ∈ R has a size s i ∈ Z + , indicating the number of places that r i occupies at any hospital. Hospitals will now rank residents of any size (including couples) as a single entity. We refer to this variant of HRC as the Hospitals / Residents problem with Sizes (HRS).
A formal definition of HRS is given in Section 2, in which we formulate an appropriate notion of stability in the HRS context. With this stability definition we later prove that, given an HRS instance where the size of each resident is at most 2 and the capacity of each hospital is at most 2, the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists is NP-complete, even if the length of each preference list is at most 3. We also show that the restriction of HRS in which each resident has size at most 2 is reducible to HRCC (essentially each resident of size 2 becomes a couple), thus implying the aforementioned NP-completeness result for HRCC.
However by contrast we also prove that, given an instance of HRS in which the length of each hospital's preference list is at most 2, a stable matching always exists and can be found in linear time. The result holds for arbitrary resident sizes and hospital capacities. This result therefore indicates a boundary between the polynomial-time solvability and NP-completeness of HRS with respect to the length of a hospital's preference list.
Related work
A version of HRS, called the Unsplittable Stable Marriage problem, was studied previously by Dean et al. [3] ; their version differs from ours in that they permit a hospital h j 's capacity to be exceeded by the assignment of a couple to h j . Dean et al. formulate the problem in terms of assigning jobs (residents) with integral sizes to machines (hospitals) with capacities. They provide a polynomial-time integral variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm that finds a stable matching in which each machine is congested by at most the processing time of the largest job. In the analogous HRS setting, their algorithm finds a stable matching in which the capacity of each hospital is oversubscribed by at most the size of the largest resident. Until now, the complexity of determining the existence of a stable matching in which none of the hospitals' capacity constraints are exceeded was an open problem.
Organisation of the paper
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give a formal definition of each of HRS and HRCC. We also show that a restricted version of the former problem can be reduced to the latter, and that an instance of either problem need not admit a stable matching. In Section 3 we prove that the problem of determining whether an HRS instance admits a stable matching is NP-complete, even if the size and capacity of each resident and hospital is at most 2 respectively, and the preference list of each resident and hospital is at most 3. Together with the reduction given in Section 2, this also establishes the NP-completeness of determining whether an HRCC instance admits a stable matching. In Section 4, we consider HRCC under classical (Gale-Shapley) stability, and show that the problem of finding, given an HRCC instance, a matching that satisfies this form of stability, or reporting that none exists, is solvable in linear time. In Section 5 we revisit HRS and consider the case where the length of each hospital's preference list is at most 2. Given an instance of this restricted version of the problem, we give a linear-time algorithm for finding a stable matching.
Formal definitions of HRS and HRCC
We firstly give a formal definition of the Hospitals / Residents problem with Sizes (HRS). An instance I of this problem is defined in the same way as an instance of HR (as defined in Section 1) except that each resident r i ∈ R has a size s i ∈ Z + . An assignment M in I is a set of (resident,hospital) pairs such that (r i , h j ) ∈ M only if r i and h j find each other acceptable. For r i ∈ R we denote {h j ∈ H :
, and for h j ∈ H we denote {s i : r i ∈ M (h j )} by O M j and refer to this as the occupancy of h j in M . We say that h j is undersubscribed
A matching is an assignment M such that |M (r i )| ≤ 1 for each r i ∈ R and O M j ≤ c j for each h j ∈ H. In other words, each resident is assigned to at most one hospital, and the sum of the sizes of the residents assigned to a hospital does not exceed its capacity. A pair (r i , h j ) ∈ R × H blocks a matching M , or is a blocking pair for M , if 1. r i is unmatched, or r i prefers h j to M (r i ), and
s kp ≤ c j . The definition implies that h j could participate in a blocking pair with r i if (i) either h j currently has room for r i , or (ii) h j can make room for r i by rejecting a set of residents it finds worse than r i . A matching is stable if it admits no blocking pair. We firstly observe that clearly HR is the special case of HRS in which s i = 1 for each r i ∈ R. The blocking pair definition for HR (which gives rise to the classical stability definition) can then be deduced from that for HRS by interpreting Condition 2 as follows: either h j is undersubscribed or prefers r i to some resident in M (h j ).
We next observe that, in contrast to HR, an HRS instance may not admit a stable matching. An example instance I that illustrates this is shown in Figure 1 (in this figure, and throughout the paper, sizes and capacities are written next to the residents and hospitals, respectively). Suppose for a contradiction that I admits a stable matching M .
Our third observation is that the restriction of HRS where each resident has size at most 2 is reducible to the Hospitals / Residents problem with Consistent Couples (HRCC), which is a special case of the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC). We now demonstrate this, but first we give a formal definition of each of HRC and HRCC.
An instance I of HRC involves a set R = {r 1 , . . . , r n } of residents, a set H = {h 1 , . . . , h m } of hospitals, and a set C of couples, i.e., ordered pairs of residents such that each resident appears in at most one pair. As in the HR case, each hospital h j ∈ H has a capacity c j ∈ Z + .
Each single resident r i ∈ R (i.e., a resident who does not belong to a couple) submits a strict preference list of acceptable hospitals. Each couple (r i , r j ) submits a joint (strict) preference list over pairs of acceptable hospitals. Each entry in this list is an ordered pair (h k , h l ) of (not necessarily distinct) hospitals representing the assignment of r i to h k and of r j to h l . Finally, each hospital h j ∈ H ranks those residents who find h j acceptable in strict order of preference.
In this context, the definition of a matching M is the same as in the classical HR setting, with the additional requirement that, for each couple (r i , r j ), if (r i , h k ) ∈ M and (r j , h l ) ∈ M then the pair (h k , h l ) must appear on the joint preference list of that couple. Following [6, Section 1.6.6], a matching M is unstable if at least one of the following holds:
1. The matching is blocked by a hospital h j and a single resident r i , as in the classical HR problem.
2. The matching is blocked by a hospital h k and a resident r i who is coupled, say with r j ; that is, h k is acceptable to r i , (r i , r j ) prefers (h k , M (r j )) to (M (r i ), M (r j )), and h k is either undersubscribed in M or prefers r i to at least one of its assigned residents in M .
3. The matching is blocked by a couple (r i , r j ) and (not necessarily distinct) hospitals
; that is, h k is acceptable to r i and h l to r j , (r i , r j ) prefers the joint assignment (h k , h l ) to (M (r i ), M (r j )), and h k (respectively h l ) is either undersubscribed in M or prefers r i (respectively r j ) to at least one of its assigned residents in M .
HRCC is the special case of HRC in which each resident (i.e., whether single or a member of a couple) ranks a subset of H in strict order of preference. Each couple (r i , r j ) ranks a subset of H × H in strict order, subject to the constraint that this joint preference list be consistent with the individual preference lists of r i and r j . That is, (r i , r j ) prefers (h p , h q ) to (h r , h s ) only if (i) either r i prefers h p to h r or h p = h r , and (ii) either r j prefers h q to h s or h q = h s . We now show that the restriction of HRS in which each resident has size at most 2 is reducible to HRCC.
Lemma 2.1. The restriction of HRS in which each resident has size at most 2 can be reduced to HRCC.
Proof. Given an instance I of the above version of the HRS problem, construct an instance I of HRCC in the following way. For each resident r i of size 2, create a couple (r i,1 , r i,2 ) in I . Suppose the preference list of r i in I is h 1 , h 2 , . . . h t . Assign to each of r i,1 and r i,2 an individual list equal to that of r i . Let the joint preference list of (
-this is clearly consistent with the lists of r i,1 and r i,2 .
For each hospital h j that finds r i acceptable in I, replace the entry r i on h j 's preference list in I with r i,1 and r i,2 in arbitrary order. Leave all residents of size 1 the same in both I and I . This ends the transformation. We claim that a stable matching exists for I if and only if one exists for I.
Suppose a stable matching M exists for I. Then, construct a stable matching M for I in the following way. If (r i , h j ) is in M , place (r i , h j ) into M if r i has size 1, else place (r i,1 , h j ) and (r i,2 , h j ) into M . Notice that the capacities of the hospitals are preserved in the reduction, and also that if a hospital h j has an occupancy of t in M , then h j is assigned t residents in M . Suppose a blocking pair exists for M in I . Then, the blocking pair must take the form of Rule 1 or 3 above, as Rule 2 is impossible by the special nature of the couple's preference lists. If there is a blocking pair (r i , h j ) by Rule 1, M surely also had the same blocking pair in I. If instead M is blocked by Rule 3, then it must be because a couple (r i,1 , r i,2 ) block with the pair (h j , h j ) in I . But then resident r i of size 2 in I must also block with hospital h j in M .
Conversely suppose a stable matching M exists for I . Then, construct a stable matching M for I in the following way. If (r i , h j ) is in M , place (r i , h j ) into M , if r i has size 1 in I, else if (r i,1 , h j ) and (r i,2 , h j ) are in M , place (r i , h j ) into M . By the nature of the preference lists, r i,1 and r i,2 are always assigned the same hospital. Suppose (r i , h j ) blocks M in I. Then, by an argument similar to the above, (r i , h j ) must have blocked M in I if r i has size 1, otherwise the pair (r i,1 , r i,2 ) must have blocked M in I with (h j , h j ).
It follows immediately from Figure 1 and Lemma 2.1 that an HRCC instance need not admit a stable matching.
NP-completeness of HRS and HRCC
This section describes the polynomial-time reduction which establishes NP-completeness for the problem of deciding whether a stable matching exists, given an HRS instance where the sizes and capacities of the residents and the hospitals respectively is at most 2, and the length of each preference list is at most 3. This reduction begins from a problem we refer to as (3, 3)-COM-SMTI. In order to define this problem, we make the following preliminary definitions. The Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI) is the restriction of HR in which each hospital has capacity 1. The Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SMTI) is a generalisation of SMI in which preference lists can include ties. We then define (3, 3)-COM-SMTI to be the problem of deciding whether a complete stable matching exists (i.e., a stable matching that matches everybody), given an instance of SMTI in which each preference list is of length at most 3, every woman's preference list is strictly ordered, and each man's preference list is either strictly ordered or is a tie of length 2 (these conditions holding simultaneously). Using a modification of a reduction appearing in [8] , we may deduce the following result, whose proof appears in the Appendix.
Given an instance I of (3, 3)-COM-SMTI with n men m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n and n women w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n , we create an instance I of HRS as follows. For each man m i with a preference list consisting of a 2-way tie (w k , w l ) where k < l, create eight residents {r i,1 , r i,2 , r i,3 , r i,4 }, {r i α,1 , r i α,2 }, and {r i β,1 , r i β,2 }. Next, create six hospitals {h i,1 , h i,2 }, {h i α,1 , h i α,2 }, and {h i β,1 , h i β,2 }. The preference lists, sizes and capacities of these residents and hospitals are as shown below:
For each man m s with a strictly ordered preference list w s 1 , w s 2 , . . . , w sz , create a resident r s with preference list h s 1 , h s 2 , . . . , h sz (ordered strictly in precisely the same fashion). Set the size of r s to be 2.
Finally, for each woman w t , with preference list m t 1 , . . . , m ty , create a hospital h t , whose preference list is intially set equal to m t 1 , . . . , m ty , temporarily placing "men" on h t 's preference list. Now, suppose that w t finds some man m j acceptable. If m j 's preference list is strictly ordered in I, replace m j on h t 's preference list with r j . If m j 's preference list is not strictly ordered, his preference list consists of a two-way tie, say, (w t , w k ). If t < k, replace m j with r j,1 on h t 's preference list, else, replace m j with r j,2 on h t 's preference list.
This ends the reduction. Clearly, it is computable in polynomial time. We now argue that it is correct by the following sequence of lemmas, each of which states a property of any stable matching M in I . Lemma 3.2. For k ∈ {1, 2}, resident r i,k is matched to some hospital in M , and that hospital is not the last hospital on his preference list.
Proof. Suppose that r i,1 is unmatched in M . Then, r i α,1 must be matched to h i α,1 , to prevent r i,1 from forming a blocking pair with h i α,1 . Resident r i α,2 must be matched to h i α,1 as well, for otherwise he forms a blocking pair with h i α,1 . But this implies (r i α,1 , h i α,2 ) is a blocking pair for M .
Suppose instead that r i,1 is matched to h i α,1 . Then, neither r i α,1 nor r i α,2 is matched to h i α,1 , else its capacity would be exceeded. So, if r i α,1 is matched to h i α,1 , r i α,2 is unmatched, and forms a blocking pair with h i α,1 . If, instead, r i α,2 is matched to h i α,2 , then r i α,1 is unmatched, and forms a blocking pair with h i α,1 . Clearly, if neither r i α,1 nor r i α,2 is matched to h i α,2 , they form blocking pairs with h i α,2 . This exhausts every possibility. It follows that if r i,1 is unmatched in M or is matched to the last hospital on his preference list, a blocking pair cannot be avoided. The same argument holds for r i,2 , by simply replacing every occurence of the subscript alpha with the subscript beta in the above proof.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3, it is clear that r i,1 and r i,2 cannot both be matched to their first choice in M , for this would result in r i,3 and r i,4 being unassigned in M , a contradiction.
On the other hand, if r i,1 and r i,2 are both matched to their second choice, then if r i,3 and r i,4 are both matched to h i,1 , then r i,2 forms a blocking pair with h i,2 . If instead r i, 3 and r i,4 are both matched to h i,2 , then r i,1 forms a blocking pair with h i,1 .
Finally, by Lemma 3.2, r i,1 and r i,2 cannot be unmatched or matched to the last hospitals on their preference lists, so exactly one of {r i,1 , r i,2 } is matched to his first choice in M , and the other to his second.
We now use Lemmas 3.2-3.4 to prove the first direction of the reduction.
Lemma 3.5. If the derived HRS instance I admits a stable matching M , then the given instance I of (3,3)-COM-SMTI admits a complete stable matching M .
Proof. Given a stable matching M for I , we describe how to construct a complete stable matching M in I as follows. Consider the residents r i,k for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} that were created in correspondence to a man m i in I with a preference list consisting of (w k , w l ), a tie of size 2, where k < l. By Lemma 3.4, either r i,1 is matched to h k or r i,2 is matched to h l in M , and, since the capacity of every hospital in I is either 2 or 1, no other resident is assigned to h k if r i,1 is, and similarly for r i,2 and h l . Hence, we construct M by placing (m i , w k ) into M if and only if (r i,1 , h k ) ∈ M , and (m i , w l ) into M if and only if (r i,2 , h l ) ∈ M . Again, Lemma 3.4 ensures we always place exactly one such pair into M . To complete the construction of M , for each resident r i corresponding to a man m i with a strictly ordered preference list, place (m i , w j ) into M if and only if (r i , h j ) ∈ M . We claim that M is indeed a matching, and is also stable.
For, we have already argued by Lemma 3.4 that no two men with ties on their preference lists are matched to the same woman in M . These men also can never be part of any blocking pair for M , for they are indifferent between the only two women on their preference list. Now, in M , the only hospitals with residents of size one on their preference lists are those hospitals which were created in correspondence to a man with a tie of size two on his preference list. So, for any resident r k corresponding to a man m k in I with a strictly ordered preference list, r k must have size two, and is matched to a hospital h j which has only residents of size two on its preference list, and so is matched to exactly one resident in M . This means exactly one man is matched to w j in M . Now, consider any woman w l whom m k prefers in M . Then, in M , resident r k must also have preferred hospital h l . Since M is stable, h l is assigned a resident it strictly prefers over r k , and hence w l is assigned a man she strictly prefers over m k in M . It follows that M is a complete stable matching in I.
We now prove the reduction is correct in the other direction. Lemma 3.6. If the given instance I of (3,3)-COM-SMTI admits a complete stable matching M , then, the derived HRS instance I admits a stable matching M .
Proof. Given a complete stable matching M for I, we describe how to construct a complete stable matching M in I. For each man m i with a strictly ordered preference list, place (r i , h j ) into M if and only if (m i , w j ) ∈ M . For each man m i in M with a tie of size 2 consisting of, say, (w k , w l ), where k < l, construct M by the following two rules: 4 , h i,1 ) into M , and assign all residents r i δ,k ∀δ ∈ {α, β} and ∀k ∈ {1, 2} with their first choice.
If (m
into M , and assign all residents r i δ,k ∀δ ∈ {α, β} and ∀k ∈ {1, 2} with their first choice.
It is easy to verify that the capacities of each hospital are not exceeded in M , and that M is a matching. We claim that M is also stable. For, suppose residents r i,t for t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are matched by Rule 1 above. Immediately we may notice that r i,2 and r i,3 are matched with their first choices, and hence cannot form a blocking pair with any hospital in I . Resident r i,1 prefers only hospital h i,1 to his assignment in M , but does not form a blocking pair with it because r i,3 and r i,4 are matched to h i,1 . The remaining resident, r i,4 prefers only h i,2 , who is matched with r i,2 , and hence does not form a blocking pair with r i,4 . All residents r i δ,k ∀δ ∈ {α, β} and ∀k ∈ {1, 2} are matched with their first choice and cannot form a blocking pair with any hospital.
Suppose residents r i,t for t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are matched by Rule 2 above. In a symmetric argument to the previous rule, r i,1 and r i,4 are matched with their first choices, and cannot be part of a blocking pair. Resident r i,2 prefers only hospital h i,2 to his assignment in M , but does not form a blocking pair with it because r i,3 and r i,4 are matched to h i,2 . The remaining resident, r i,3 prefers only h i,1 , who is matched with r i,1 , and hence cannot form a blocking pair with r i,3 . Again, the residents r i δ,k ∀δ ∈ {α, β} and ∀k ∈ {1, 2} are matched with their first choice and cannot form a blocking pair with any hospital.
In the final case, a resident r i corresponding to a man m i with a strictly ordered preference list in I cannot block for the same reasons that m i did not block in M . If m i preferred a woman w j in M , then r i must also prefer h j in M . However, h j must be matched to a resident that precedes r i on its preference list, since w j is matched to a man preceding m i on her preference list. The capacity of h j is 2, and the size of r i is also 2, so that r i cannot be "added" to h j . Therefore, M is a stable matching for I . Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6 immediately imply the following theorem.
Theorem 3.7. The problem of determining whether an HRS instance admits a stable matching is NP-complete, even if the size of each resident and the capacity of each hospital is at most 2, and the lengths of the residents' and hospitals' preference lists are at most 3 (these conditions holding simultaneously).
The following corollary follows immediately by Theorem 3.7 and Lemma 2.1.
Corollary 3.8. The problem of determining whether an HRCC instance admits a stable matching is NP-complete, even if the individual preference list of each resident and the joint preference list of each couple has at most 3 entries, and the capacity of each hospital is at most 2.
HRCC under classical (Gale-Shapley) stability
In this section we describe a linear-time algorithm for HRCC when stability is defined with respect to classical (Gale-Shapley) stability, as defined in [6, Section 1.6.1], without any assumptions on the lengths of the preference lists or capacities of the hospitals. Let I be an instance of HRCC in which C is the set of couples. In order to describe this algorithm, it is convenient to represent I as an HR instance I in which each couple (r i , r j ) ∈ C is replaced by two single residents r i and r j in I, each of whom has the same preference list, which is derived from that of (r i , r j ) by replacing each pair (h k , h k ) by h k in I. The goal is to find a stable matching M for I such that for each couple (r i , r j ) ∈ C, M (r i ) = M (r j ), or each of r i and r j is unmatched. We call such a stable matching M a feasible stable matching. Henceforth let M denote the set of all stable matchings for an instance I of HR. In this section, we show that this problem is solvable in polynomial time by exploiting the known results about the rich structure of M. In order to develop the necessary tools to create an efficient algorithm, we list some of the known results about the structure of M, beginning with the following relation which induces a partial order on M [6] .
Definition 4.1. Let M and M be stable matchings for an HR instance. We say that
Notice in fact that a stable matching dominates itself. While we do not necessarily need the result here, it is interesting to note that (M, ) forms a distributive lattice. When the Gale-Shapley algorithm is run, if the sequence of proposals come from the residents, the resulting matching is the resident-optimal stable matching, denoted M R , in which each resident is matched to the best hospital he can ever be matched to in any stable matching for the instance. If instead the sequence of proposals come from the hospitals, the resulting stable matching is the hospital-optimal stable matching (M H ). M R and M H are the maximum and minimum elements, respectively of this lattice of stable matchings [6, Section 1.6.5]. It is this underlying structure of M that will allow us to develop the efficient algorithm presented in this section. Conveniently, we do not require a complete discussion of the known results about M to explain the algorithm and argue it is correct. We will, however, make use of the following propositions [6, Section 1.6.5]. Since our goal in this section is to develop an algorithm to match couples together, Proposition 4.3 implies that if, for some instance of the problem, we have a stable matching in which one member of a couple is matched and the other is unmatched, no feasible stable matching exists, for there is no stable matching in which they are either both matched or both unmatched. We require one final proposition, which follows as a corollary of results from [6, Lemma 1. 
Breakmarriage
The algorithm we develop will use as a subroutine a slightly modified version of an algorithm known as Breakmarriage, first defined by McVitie and Wilson [12] and used again by Gusfield [5] . Let M H denote the hospital-optimal stable matching. Our modified version of algorithm Breakmarriage takes as input a stable matching M = M H , and a resident r i with M (r i ) = M H (r i ), and outputs a new stable matching dominated by M . A description of Breakmarriage(M, r i ) is defined below:
Given the stable matching M and resident r i as input, restart the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm by deleting the pair (r i , M (r i )). Resident r i is now free, and hospital M (r i ) is "semi-free" in that it only accepts a new proposal from a resident it strictly prefers to r i . Algorithm Breakmarriage(M, r i ) begins with r i proposing to the first hospital following M (r i ) on his preference list, and this initiates a sequence of proposals, rejections, and acceptances as given by the resident-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm [6, Section 1.6.3]. Algorithm Breakmarriage(M, r i ) terminates when M (r i ) receives a proposal from a resident r k whom it prefers to r i . The current set of assignments M is then output.
The following facts hold about Breakmarriage(M, r i ) [12, 5] : Repeatedly calling algorithm Breakmarriage ultimately yields the hospital-optimal stable matching M H , the only stable matching Breakmarriage cannot take as input.
We are now ready to describe the algorithm for finding a feasible stable matching or reporting "none exists". The algorithm begins by computing the resident-optimal stable matching M R and the hospital-optimal stable matching M H . If M R is feasible, the algorithm returns M R . Otherwise, if for any resident couple (r i , r j ) it is the case that r i is matched and r j is unmatched (or vice versa), the algorithm halts, reporting no feasible stable matching exists. Only if no such couple exists do we enter the while loop whose condition is that the current matching M is not feasible -hence there is some couple (r i , r j ) with M (r i ) = M (r j ). The algorithm then checks if either the worst resident assigned to M (r i ) or the worst resident assigned to M (r j ) has the same partners in M and M H . If so, the algorithm outputs "No feasible stable matching exists." Otherwise, if both the worst resident assigned to M (r i ) and the worst resident assigned to M (r j ) have different partners in M and M H , we call algorithm Breakmarriage on the current matching M and the worst resident assigned to M (r i ) or the worst resident assigned to M (r j ). The loop is exited only when the algorithm outputs "none exists" or when the current matching M is feasible. The pseudocode for the algorithm is presented in Figure 2 .
if (one member of c is matched in M and the other is unmatched in M ) report "no feasible stable matching exists"; HALT; while (some couple (r i , r j ) has M (r i ) = M (r j )) if (either of the worst residents assigned to M (r i ) and M (r j ) are matched to their partners in M H ) report "no feasible stable matching exists"; HALT; else 
Correctness and complexity
We now establishing the correctness and complexity of algorithm MatchCouples. Proof. Suppose a feasible stable matching does not exist for the given instance. Then, the algorithm must eventually halt, either before entering the while loop, because there is a couple c ∈ C such that one member is matched in M R and the other is unmatched, or inside the while loop. If the while loop is entered, the algorithm will eventually either reach M H or some other stable matching for which a resident couple (r i , r j ) has M (r i ) = M H (r i ) or M (r j ) = M H (r j ). In either case, the algorithm will correctly report "no feasible stable matching exists." So, suppose instead that a feasible stable matching M f does exist. We claim that the algorithm maintains the invariant that the current matching M at any given interation of the while loop dominates M f . The claim is clearly true for the first iteration when M = M R , by Proposition 4.2. So let us assume it is true for the first i − 1 iterations. At the ith iteration of the while loop, if M is not feasible, then some couple (r i , r j ) ∈ C has M (r i ) = M (r j ). This implies both hospitals h k = M (r i ) and h l = M (r j ) must have a different set of residents in M f than in the current matching M , for otherwise r i and r j will not be together in M f . Since M dominates M f , and
, Proposition 4.4 implies that for both h k and h l , the least preferred resident assigned in M is different from the least preferred resident assigned in M f . Hence by Proposition 4.6, when Breakmarriage(M, r z ) is called and passed the worst resident assigned to either h k or h l as r z , the stable matching M returned is either equal to M f or dominates M f , so that the matching at iteration i + 1 also dominates M f . Since the number of stable matchings is finite, the algorithm must eventually converge to M f , or to a feasible stable matching that dominates M f .
To establish the claimed running time, we note that by Proposition 4.7 the total time the algorithm spends on calls to algorithm Breakmarriage is O(L). By using appropriate data structures, and an approach similar to [5] the total time the algorithm spends on the calls to Breakmarriage and the additional operations is bounded by O(L).
assign all residents to be free; while (some resident r i is free) and (r i has a nonempty list) h j ← first hospital on r i 's list; provisionally assign r i to h j ; // in matching M if (r i is h j 's first choice) In light of the NP-completeness result for HRS presented in Section 3, it is natural to ask, if, by specialising the problem version, we can identify a "boundary" for which the HRS problem becomes polynomial-time solvable. One option for us to consider is to allow the sizes of the residents to be at most 1, rather than 2. This restriction would, of course, yield an instance of the classical Hospitals / Residents problem, which is polynomial-time solvable. A different option is to further restrict the lengths of the preference lists for the residents and/or the hospitals. We show that by restricting the lengths of the preference list of each hospital to be at most 2, rather than 3, a stable matching always exists, and an extension of the Gale-Shapley algorithm finds a stable matching in polynomial time, even if no restriction is placed on the sizes of the residents, the lengths of the preference lists of the residents, or the capacities of the hospitals. Since NP-completeness for HRS holds even for hospital preference lists of length at most 3, the results of this section indicate such a boundary for HRS. We refer to an instance of the HRS problem in which the lengths of the hospitals' preference lists are at most 2 and the residents' lists are unbounded as (∞, 2)-HRS.
The procedure for solving (∞, 2)-HRS is as follows. The algorithm can be seen as a process of "proposal" operations from the residents to the hospitals. A resident proposes sequentially to each hospital on his list until he becomes assigned or his list becomes empty. When a resident r i proposes to a hospital h j , r i becomes provisionally assigned to h j . If r i is that hospital's first choice, we let r k denote the resident succeeding r i on h j 's preference list, if any. If s i + s k > c j , the pair (r k , h j ) is deleted, meaning r k is removed from h j 's preference list, and h j is removed from r k 's preference list. This is the only time a (resident,hospital) pair is deleted by the algorithm. The algorithm continues this process until each resident is either assigned a hospital or has an empty list. The details of the algorithm are shown in Figure 3 .
Let us now establish the correctness and time complexity of the algorithm presented. Proof. We first claim that the matching M consisting of the provisional assignments at the termination of Algorithm (∞, 2)-HRS is stable. To see this, consider an arbitrary resident r i who is unmatched or prefers a hospital h j to his assignment in M . Then, since r i is not assigned to h j in M and prefers h j to his current assignment, h j must have been deleted from r i 's preference list. But this can only happen if r i is h j 's second choice and h j was assigned to its first choice at some point in the algorithm and does not have enough spare capacity to add r i . But h j 's first choice can never become unassigned from h j at any subsequent step of the algorithm -so in fact r i cannot block with h j in M . Since r i was chosen arbitrarily it follows that no resident is part of a blocking pair in M . Secondly, we claim that Algorithm (∞, 2)-HRS never deletes a stable pair (i.e., a (resident,hospital) pair that belongs to some stable matching). For, suppose that (r k , h j ) is the first such pair deleted during an arbitrary execution of the algorithm. Then r k was deleted because some resident r i preceding r k on h j 's preference list became assigned to h j and s i + s k > c j . Now, since no stable pair has been deleted prior to this point, r i is either matched to h j or to a hospital lower than h j , or is unmatched in any stable matching. Since r i and r k cannot both be matched to h j in any stable matching, it follows that if (r k , h j ) is in a stable matching, then (r i , h j ) blocks M .
Thus we have shown that M is stable and that each resident is assigned to their optimal partner in M . Lastly, with the aid of data structures similar to those used to achieve an O(L) implementation of the Gale-Shapley algorithm for HR [6] , we acheive a similar complexity for algorithm (∞, 2)-HRS.
Concluding remarks
Our stability definition for HRS allows a resident r i to displace a group of inferior residents of a given total size, so long as this frees up enough space for r i . This could, of course, include a situation whereby a group of inferior residents of total size 10 is displaced in order to make way for a resident of size 1, for example. Our definition assumes that the quality of the assignees takes precedence over the size. However it may be the case that a hospital's primary concern is to ensure that its occupancy is as high as possible. Thus it would not participate in a blocking pair if its occupancy were to reduce as a result of rejecting the inferior residents and taking on the new resident. This gives rise to an alternative stability definition which is obtained from the one given for HRS in Section 2 by modifying Condition 2 as follows:
It remains open to investigate the algorithmic complexity of the problem of finding a matching that satisfies this new version of stability, for a given HRS instance. 3 .) Also |c j | = 3 for each c j ∈ C. We form an instance I of (3,3)-COM-SMTI as follows. The set of men in I is X ∪ P ∪ U ∪ Q, where X = ∪ n−1 i=0 X i , X i = {x 4i+r : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3} (0 ≤ i ≤ n−1), P = ∪ m j=1 P j , P j = {p 1 j , p 2 j , p 3 j } (1 ≤ j ≤ m), U = ∪ m j=1 U j , U j = {u 1 j , u 2 j , u 3 j } (1 ≤ j ≤ m), and Q = {q j : c j ∈ C}. The set of women in I is Y ∪ C ∪ W ∪ Z, where Y = ∪ n−1 i=0 Y i , Y i = {y 4i+r : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3} (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), C = {c s j : c j ∈ C ∧ 1 ≤ s ≤ 3}, W = {w j : c j ∈ C}, Z = ∪ m j=1 Z j and Z j = {z 1 j , z 2 j , z 3 j } (1 ≤ j ≤ m). The preference lists of the men and women in I are shown in Figure 4 . In a given preference list, entries within round brackets are tied. In the preference list of an agent x 4i+r ∈ X (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and r ∈ {0, 1}), the symbol c(x 4i+r ) denotes the woman c s j ∈ C such that the (r + 1)th occurrence of literal v i appears at position s of c j . Similarly if r ∈ {2, 3} then the symbol c(x 4i+r ) denotes the woman c s j ∈ C such that the (r − 1)th occurrence of literalv i appears at position s of c j . Also in the preference list of an agent c s j ∈ C , if literal v i appears at position s of clause c j ∈ C, the symbol x(c s j ) denotes the man x 4i+r−1 where r = 1, 2 according as this is the first or second occurrence of literal v i in B. Otherwise if literalv i appears at position s of clause c j ∈ C, the symbol x(c s j ) denotes the man x 4i+r+1 where r = 1, 2 according as this is the first or second occurrence of literalv i in B. Clearly each preference list is of length at most 3, the men's lists are strictly ordered, and each woman's list is either strictly ordered or is a tie of length 2.
For each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), let T i = {(x 4i+r , y 4i+r ) : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3} and F i = {(x 4i+r , y 4i+r+1 )} : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3}, where addition is taken modulo 4.
We claim that B is satisfiable if and only if I admits a complete weakly stable matching. For, let f be a satisfying truth assignment of B. Define a complete matching M in I as follows. For each variable v i ∈ V , if v i is true under f , add the pairs in T i to M , otherwise add the pairs in F i to M . Now let c j ∈ C. As c j contains a literal that is true under f , let s ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote the position of c j in which this literal occurs. Add the pairs (p k j , c k j ) and (u k j , z k j ) (1 ≤ k = s ≤ 3), (p s j , z s j ), (q j , c s j ) and (u s j , w j ) to M . As M is a complete matching in I, clearly no woman in Y ∪ Z can be involved in a blocking pair of M in I. Nor can a man in P ∪ U (since he can only potentially prefer a woman in Z), nor a man in Q (since he can only potentially prefer a woman in C, who ranks him last), nor a woman in W (since she can only potentially prefer a man in U , who ranks him last). Now suppose that (x 4i+r , c(x 4i+r )) blocks M , where 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and 0 ≤ r ≤ 3. Let c s j = c(x 4i+r ), where 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ s ≤ 3. Then (q j , c s j ) ∈ M . If r ∈ {0, 1} then (x 4i+r , y 4i+r+1 ) ∈ M , so that v i is false under f . But literal v i occurs in c j , a contradiction, since literal v i was supposed to be true under f by construction of M . Hence r ∈ {2, 3} and (x 4i+r , y 4i+r ) ∈ M , so that v i is true under f . But literalv i occurs in c j , a contradiction, since literalv i was supposed to be true under f by construction of M . Hence M is weakly stable in I.
Conversely suppose that M is a complete weakly stable matching in I. We form a truth assignment f in B as follows. For each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), if M ∩ (X i × Y i ) = T i , set v i to be true under f . Otherwise M ∩ (X i × Y i ) = F i , in which case we set v i to be false under f . Now let c j be a clause in C (1 ≤ j ≤ m). There exists some s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3) such that (q j , c s j ) ∈ M . Let x 4i+r = x(c s j ) for some i (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) and r (0 ≤ r ≤ 3). If r ∈ {0, 1} then (x 4i+r , y 4i+r ) ∈ M by the weak stability of M . Thus variable v i is true under f , and hence clause c j is true under f , since literal v i occurs in this clause. If r ∈ {2, 3} then (x 4i+r , y 4i+r+1 ) ∈ M (where addition is taken modulo 4) by the weak stability of M . Thus variable v i is false under f , and hence clause c j is true under f , since literalv i occurs in this clause. Hence f is a satisfying truth assignment of B.
